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Abstract 
Traditional Medicare imposes significant cost-sharing on beneficiaries. Most but not all 
beneficiaries obtain supplemental insurance through Medigap, Medicare Advantage, Medicaid, 
or employer-sponsored retiree coverage, which may vary in how well they protect against the 
risk of high spending. This paper uses data from the Health and Retirement Study for the years 
2002 through 2016 to document how supplemental coverage for Medicare beneficiaries 65 and 
older has changed over time, and to estimate the distribution of out-of-pocket spending for 
enrollees with different coverage types. I find that the shares of beneficiaries with employer-
sponsored supplemental coverage or Medigap declined between 2002 and 2016, whereas the 
shares with Medicare Advantage or no supplemental coverage for doctor and hospital bills have 
increased. The majority of those with no supplemental coverage for doctor and hospital bills 
have Medicare Part D, which covers prescription drug expenses. I find that all supplemental 
coverage types are associated with lower observed dispersion in out-of-pocket medical care 
spending, measuring dispersion as the ratio of the 90th to the 50th percentile or the standard 
deviation. All supplemental insurance types are associated with a lower probability that out-of-
pocket medical care spending exceeds 10% of household income, while all but Medicaid are 
associated with a significantly higher probability that total out-of-pocket health spending (that is, 
medical care plus health insurance premiums) exceeds this threshold. Thus, all supplemental 
insurance forms effectively function as insurance, translating uncertain medical costs into more 
predictable — although still potentially burdensome — premiums. 
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High out-of-pocket health care costs are a significant threat to older Americans’ 
financial security. Even with near-universal Medicare coverage beginning at age 65, the 
median older household devotes 12% of its budget to medical care and health 
insurance, compared with less than 3% for nonelderly households (Gruber and Levy 
2009). Moreover, this spending is highly concentrated, with 5% of households 
responsible for half of out-of-pocket spending on medical care (DeNardi et al. 2016). 
One reason older households are at risk of high spending is that traditional 
Medicare coverage leaves beneficiaries exposed to potentially very high levels of cost-
sharing, with no cap on their total cost. To limit their risk exposure, most traditional 
Medicare enrollees obtain supplemental coverage to limit their exposure to risk through 
Medicaid, an employer-sponsored plan, or by buying a private Medigap plan, but 19% 
do not (Cubanski et al. 2018). Moreover, neither Medigap plans nor employer-
sponsored retiree plans are required to cap enrollee out-of-pocket costs, unlike private 
plans for nonelderly individuals. While Medicare Advantage plans limit enrollee cost-
sharing, the out-of-pocket cap is still very high — currently $6,700 per individual. Thus, 
with the exception of those who have Medicaid in addition to Medicare, all Medicare 
enrollees are potentially at risk of quite high out-of-pocket spending. 
Which households are at risk of high out-of-pocket health care spending and 
why? This work updates earlier research by Goldman and Zissimopoulos (2003), who 
found using 1998 data that those with Medigap had out-of-pocket spending that was as 
high as or higher than traditional Medicare enrollees with no supplemental coverage, 
while beneficiaries with supplemental employer or Medicare Advantage have somewhat 
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lower spending. The health insurance landscape for Medicare beneficiaries has shifted 
in the past two decades. These changes include the implementation of Medicare Part D 
in 2006, the shift to high-deductible plans in the under-65 health insurance market, and 
the ongoing erosion of employer-sponsored retiree coverage. All of these changes have 
the potential to affect older Americans’ exposure to health spending risk.  
In this paper, I analyze data on health insurance coverage and out-of-pocket 
health spending for Medicare beneficiaries 65 and older from the nationally 
representative Health and Retirement Study over the period 2002 through 2016. This 
analysis yields several interesting results. First, there have been substantial changes in 
the distribution of Medicare beneficiaries’ supplemental coverage over time, in 
particular, declines in the share who have employer-sponsored coverage or Medigap as 
a supplement to Medicare, and an increase in the share with Medicare Advantage. On 
net, the fraction who have no supplemental coverage has dropped if Medicare Part D, 
which covers only prescription drugs, is counted as supplemental coverage: The 
fraction without supplemental coverage for doctor and hospital bills has increased, 
however. Second, while different supplemental coverage types place different levels of 
cost burden on beneficiaries, all of them reduce the observed dispersion of out-of-
pocket spending (measured as ratio of 90th percentile to 50th percentile) compared to no 
supplemental coverage.  
2. Background on Medicare and supplemental coverage for 
beneficiaries 65 and older 
Traditional Medicare coverage, consisting of Part A for hospital care and Part B 
for doctors’ bills, exposes beneficiaries to out-of-pocket spending for two reasons. First, 
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many services are simply not covered; for example, neither dental care not routine eye 
exams are covered by Medicare.  Second, even for services that are covered, traditional 
Medicare requires both a deductible and cost-sharing with no cap on what the 
beneficiary may be asked to pay.1 
Because of traditional Medicare’s gaps, most beneficiaries have coverage from 
some other source. Possible sources of coverage include: 
• Medicaid: Beneficiaries with very low income and assets qualify for 
Medicaid, which has minimal cost-sharing of any kind.  
• Employer-sponsored coverage: Many beneficiaries have access to 
private coverage from their own or a spouse’s current or former 
employer. Employers may contribute to premiums for this coverage, but 
they also may not. These plans may place a cap on enrollee liability for 
out-of-pocket costs, but there is no requirement that they do so. 
• Medicare Advantage: Medicare beneficiaries also have the option of 
enrolling in a Medicare Advantage plan, sometimes called a Medicare 
HMO. In 2020, these plans are required to cap enrollee out-of-pocket 
spending at no more than $6,700 for in-network services. 
                                               
1 The cost-sharing structure in traditional Medicare is complex. Under Part A, beneficiaries face 
a deductible of $1,408 in 2020 per “benefit period,” defined as beginning when the beneficiary 
is admitted to a hospital or skilled nursing facility and ending when the beneficiary has not 
received any inpatient or skilled nursing care in a 60-day period. Part B has a deductible of 
$198. Beyond the deductible, Part A has a nonlinear cost-sharing structure under which 
beneficiaries face no costs for 60 days, $352 per day for days 60 through 90, $704 per day for 
days 91 and beyond up to a total of 60 “lifetime reserve days,” after which beneficiaries bear 
all costs under Part A. Part B cost-sharing beyond the deductible is 20 percent with no cap. 
Sources: https://www.medicare.gov/your-medicare-costs/medicare-costs-at-a-glance and 
definition of benefit period. 
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• Medigap: Private insurers also offer Medicare supplemental or 
“Medigap” plans, which are highly regulated and have standardized plan 
offerings. As of 2020, only two Medigap plans had limits on out-of-pocket 
costs ($5,880 for Plan K and $2,940 for Plan L).2 
• Medicare Part D: Since 2006, Medicare beneficiaries with Parts A and B 
have had the option to enroll in Part D, which provides coverage for 
prescription drug expenses only. In 2021, Beneficiary out-of-pocket 
spending for Part D plans is capped at $6,550. 
Even with supplemental coverage, not all plans will cover all services, such as 
dental care. Moreover, some out-of-pocket spending caps on covered services are quite 
high.  
3. Data and methods 
The analysis uses data from the 2002 through 2016 Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS), a longitudinal panel study of older Americans described in more detail elsewhere 
(Sonnega et al. 2014). Data are collected in even-numbered years, with sample sizes 
ranging from about 16,000 to 20,000 in each year. Table 1 shows sample sizes in the 
full HRS and in my analysis sample. I begin by restricting the sample to respondents 65 
and older at the time of the interview who also have Medicare, yielding a sample size of 
about 10,000 in each year. The sample is further reduced by dropping a very small 
number of observations missing key covariates (age, health status, gender, education). 




The final sample consists of approximately 10,000 observations per year, with 19,464 
unique individuals in the analysis sample during the period 2002 through 2016. 
Health insurance measures are based on respondent reports of coverage at 
each survey wave. Respondents are asked whether or not they have Medicare, and 
only respondents 65 and older who report having Medicare (nearly all of those in this 
age range) are included in the analysis. Supplemental coverage measures are 
constructed from respondent reports of whether they are enrolled in a Medicare 
Advantage plan; whether they are covered by Medicaid; whether they are enrolled in a 
Medicare Part D plan; and whether they have any private insurance coverage. 
Respondents with private coverage are asked about the source of their coverage (own 
or spouse’s current or former employer, directly from an insurance company, etc.). I use 
this to distinguish between employer-sponsored coverage and Medigap coverage. 
Some respondents report more than one coverage type in addition to Medicare. For 
example, a respondent might report having both employer-sponsored coverage and a 
Medicare Advantage plan. In practice, this overlap is quite rare. I define mutually 
exclusive categories of supplemental coverage using the following hierarchy to code 
coverage of individuals who report more than one source: Medicaid > employer 
coverage > Medigap > Medicare Advantage > Part D. So, for example, a respondent 
reporting both employer coverage and an Medicare Advantage plan would be 
categorized as having employer coverage.  
The HRS measures out-of-pocket health care spending in eight broad categories: 
hospitals (HOSP), outpatient surgery (OPS), doctor visits (DR), home health care 
(HHC), dental care (DENT), prescription drugs (DRUG), specialty care (SPEC), and 
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nursing home care (NHM).3 I use cleaned and imputed values for all of these spending 
variables provided in the RAND HRS file. Variables in the RAND HRS file reflect the 
two-year recall period used in the HRS. I divide these numbers in half to get annual 
spending numbers, and inflate these values to 2016 dollars using the CPI-U. Therefore, 
the amounts reported in my analysis are for real, annual, out-of-pocket spending in 
2016 dollars. I define out-of-pocket spending on medical care as the sum of these eight 
categories.  Respondents are also asked about their premium spending for up to three 
private health insurance plans, Medicare Advantage coverage, and prescription drug 
coverage (private and Part D). I consider the sum of these amounts to be out-of-pocket 
spending on health insurance. Summing out-of-pocket spending on medical care and 
health insurance yields what I define as total out-of-pocket spending on health. 
4. Results, Part 1: Supplemental coverage trends over time; enrollee 
characteristics by coverage type; and beneficiary out-of-pocket 
premium spending 
Figure 1 shows supplemental coverage of Medicare beneficiaries 65 and older 
from 2002 through 2016. In 2002, employers were the most common source of 
supplemental coverage, covering 42% of Medicare beneficiaries ages 65 and older. By 
2016, this fraction had declined to 25%. Medigap was the second most common source 
of supplemental coverage in 2002, covering 21% of beneficiaries. By 2016, this had 
declined to 14%. Together, these two sources of supplemental private coverage went 
                                               
3 In addition, beginning in 2010, a catch-all other category was added (OTHX); this category 
averages $140. I ignore it for cross-wave consistency. 
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from covering 63% of beneficiaries in 2002 to only 39% in 2016. Medicare Advantage 
filled some of this gap, doubling its market share from 14% in 2002 to 28% in 2016. The 
fraction with Medicaid was quite stable at 7 to 9% over this period. Part D coverage, 
introduced in 2006, grew to cover 18% of beneficiaries in 2016.  
The net result of all these shifts is that the fraction with no supplemental 
coverage declined from 16% in 2002 to only 5% in 2016. However, taking into account 
the fact that Part D covers only prescription drugs, the fraction with no supplemental 
coverage for doctor and hospital bills actually increased from 16% in 2002 to 23% in 
2016. Therefore, it is unclear whether on average, Medicare beneficiaries’ out-of-pocket 
spending risk has increased or decreased over this period. 
Before proceeding to the out-of-spending risk analysis, note two facts about 
supplemental coverage: First, there is nonrandom selection into these different types of 
supplemental coverage. Table 2 shows average enrollee characteristics – age, fair/poor 
health, gender, poverty status, and education – by coverage type in 2016. Medicaid 
beneficiaries are, unsurprisingly, different from the other groups of beneficiaries, being 
significantly older, sicker, poorer, less well-educated, and more likely to be female than 
all other groups. Those with no supplemental coverage also tend to be poorer and 
sicker than individuals with coverage. These differences are a useful reminder that 
whether an individual has supplemental coverage, and if so what type they have, is the 
result of (constrained) choices by that individual. Therefore, in comparing out-of-pocket 
spending patterns across groups, it would be wrong to infer that coverage differences 
are responsible in a causal sense for any observed spending differences across 
respondent groups with different coverage types. For example, conditional on 
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observable covariates such as self-reported health status, individuals who forego 
coverage may be (unobservably) healthier or less likely to use services to begin with, so 
that the observed spending difference between those with and without any 
supplemental coverage may understate the true impact of coverage on spending. (Note 
that the same argument applies to differences across groups in the dispersion of 
spending.)  
Second, premium spending may differ significantly with coverage type. Table 3 
shows average premiums overall; the fraction of enrollees who pay zero premium for 
supplemental coverage; and average, out-of-pocket, annual premium spending, 
conditional on having a nonzero premium, by supplemental coverage type. 
Unsurprisingly, Medicaid enrollees report paying almost no premiums, while nearly all 
Medigap enrollees (88%) have to pay something for their coverage. Thirty-six percent of 
enrollees in employer plans and 42% of Medicare Advantage enrollees do not have to 
pay out-of-pocket for coverage. Among those who do pay for these types of coverage, 
those with employer coverage pay the most ($3,322 per year), followed closely by 
Medigap enrollees ($2,963). Beneficiaries’ health spending risk is largely a function of 
out-of-pocket health care spending, rather than premiums, which are not uncertain ex 
ante in the way that out-of-pocket health care spending is. Therefore, the next set of 
results focuses on the distribution of health care spending without addressing 
premiums. I then present measures of the economic burden of households’ spending, 
both with and without out-of-pocket premium spending. 
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5. Results, Part 2: Out-of-pocket health care spending; median and 
dispersion by insurance type  
Figure 2 shows trends over time in median out-of-pocket health care spending 
overall and by supplemental insurance type. Median spending overall is less than 
$1,000 and declines slightly over time between 2002 and 2016. Looking at differences 
by supplemental insurance type, spending is lowest for beneficiaries with Medicaid 
coverage and highest for those with Medigap or Part D. These gradients by coverage 
type are largely stable over time, although spending for the group without any 
supplemental coverage drops in 2006 in a way consistent with the idea that 
beneficiaries with high out-of-pocket spending may have been more likely to enroll in 
Part D when it became available (Levy and Weir 2010). Zeroing in on one point in time, 
Figure 3 presents different moments of the out-of-pocket spending distribution by 
supplemental insurance status in 2016. This figure shows that the spending 
distribution’s 10th percentile is zero for nearly all Medicare beneficiaries. As we move up 
the distribution, spending increases more slowly for those with Medicaid than for other 
beneficiaries, as we would expect, with spending for other groups increasing at a 
generally similar rate through approximately the 75th percentile. At the distribution’s 
highest points, those with no coverage and those with Medicaid report the highest out-
of-pocket spending.4 
The fact that at the median, out-of-pocket spending is slightly higher for 
individuals with Medigap or Part D than for those with no coverage at all reinforces the 
                                               
4 Further data quality analysis is needed to see whether the Medicaid result is spurious. 
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importance of selection into coverage, as discussed above. In order to control for some 
observable elements of selection, such as demographic characteristics and self-
reported measures of health, I estimate multivariate models of the form: 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1 ∙ 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏2 ∙ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 + 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (1) 
where insurance typej is a vector of supplemental insurance types. Xit is a vector of 
individual characteristics including age, gender, self-reported health status (excellent, 
very good, good, fair, poor), labor force status, years of education, number of activities 
of daily living for which the respondent has a limitation, number of instrumental activities 
of daily living for which the respondent has a limitation number, and number of chronic 
health conditions. YEARt is a vector of dummies for years 2002 through 2016. Model 
estimates use ordinary least squares with survey weights. For comparison, I also 
estimate a model without the vector of individual-level controls and the year dummies; 
that is, the model’s only explanatory variables are the insurance type dummies, so this 
model simply estimates the differences in mean spending across groups defined by 
insurance type. 
Table 4 reports the coefficients from both models: Column 1 reports the 
coefficients from the model without controls, while Column 2 reports coefficients from 
the model with controls. Focusing primarily on the model with controls, which addresses 
observable selection into coverage based on demographic and health characteristics, 
the estimates suggest that beneficiaries with Medicare Part D have out-of-pocket health 
care spending that is the same as those with no supplemental coverage, while those 
with Medicare Advantage and employer coverage have spending that is slightly lower 
than, but not significantly different from, the spending of those without supplemental 
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coverage. Medigap enrollees have slightly higher out-of-pocket spending than those 
without supplemental coverage. Meanwhile, Medicaid beneficiaries have much lower 
mean spending than every other group. Thus, the multivariate linear regression models 
with simple covariates largely paint the same picture as the medians in Figure 2: At the 
middle of the distribution (median or mean), insurance — with the notable exception of 
Medicaid — may not be doing that much to reduce spending. 
From an economic perspective, the point of insurance is to reduce risk 
associated with the realization of a random variable — in this case, out-of-pocket 
medical care spending. More simply put, insurance’s real purpose is to rein in the top 
tail of the distribution. I will use two measures of the dispersion of observed spending 
(the realization of the random variable) as a proxy for risk: The standard deviation and 
the ratio of 90th to 50th percentile. The 90/50 ratio, in particular, measures whether there 
is a long right tail on the distribution of out-of-pocket spending, which would suggest a 
lack of true insurance against costly events. Figure 4 presents the ratio of the 90th 
percentile to the 50th percentile of the out-of-pocket spending distribution, over time and 
by supplemental coverage type. This figure suggests that most types of supplemental 
coverage have a smaller 90/50 ratio than no coverage, as one would expect. The 
exception is Medicaid although in this case, the quite high 90/50 ratio is driven largely 
by extremely low median spending in Medicaid. The standard deviation (Figure 5) is 
much noisier but appears to be higher, in recent years, for no coverage than for those 
with any supplemental coverage. 
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6. Results, Part 3: Health spending compared to household income 
Insurance may reduce risk in the economic sense, but we are also interested in 
the financial burden that average health spending represents compared to a 
household’s income. Figures 6 and 7 present trends on the share of beneficiaries 
whose out-of-pocket health care spending exceeds 10% of their household income. The 
estimates in Figure 6 do not include premium spending in out-of-pocket health care 
spending while those in Figure 7 do include premiums. Figure 6 shows that over time, 
around 20 to 25% of all Medicare beneficiaries 65 and older spend more than 10% of 
their household income on out-of-pocket medical care. Figure 7 is similar, but the 
outcome variable is total out-of-pocket health spending; that is, medical care plus health 
insurance premiums. On average, out-of-pocket premium spending for this group is 
about half as much as out-of-pocket medical care spending. Including premiums, more 
than a third of all beneficiaries 65 and older devote more than 10% of their income to 
out-of-pocket health spending. For Medigap enrollees, who pay the most in out-of-
pocket premiums, just over one-half devote more than 10% of their income to out-of-
pocket spending on health. 
I also estimate multivariate models that use the same covariates as equation (1) 
above, but with a dependent variable equal to 1 if the individual has out-of-pocket 
spending greater than 10% of their household income. Out-of-pocket spending is 
measured both without premiums (that is: medical care spending only) and with 
premiums. For each of these outcomes, results are presented for a model with no 
controls and a model with the full set of demographic and health-related controls 
described above.  These results are presented in Table 5. As before, the inclusion of 
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these controls does surprisingly little to change the overall pattern of results. But the 
difference between the models for out-of-pocket spending on medical care versus those 
for out-of-pocket spending on medical care plus premiums (column 2 versus column 4) 
are striking. Compared to having no supplemental coverage, any kind of supplemental 
coverage – except Medicaid – reduces the risk of a high out-of-pocket spending burden 
for medical care while increasing the risk of a high out-of-pocket spending burden for 
medical care plus premiums (where “high” is defined as greater than 10% of household 
income). Medicaid uniformly reduces the risk of both types of spending burden. For all 
coverage types other than Medicaid, however, the tradeoff is fairly clear: Households 
are spending upfront on premiums in order to reduce bills later. (This is, after all, how 
insurance works.) 
7. Discussion 
This analysis shows that Medicare beneficiaries with supplemental insurance 
coverage generally face less risk of high out-of-pocket medical spending than those 
who have no such coverage. The tradeoff is that, except for those who have Medicaid, 
they also face higher premium payments.   
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Table 1: Health and Retirement Study, 2002 – 2016; total sample size and size of 
the analytic sample for this study 
 




Age>=65, has Medicare, no 
missing variables 
 Observations Observations Observations Observations: Households: 
2002 18,166 10,908 10,564 10,556 8,060 
2004 20,129 11,095 10,701 10,690 8,106 
2006 18,469 11,362 10,935 10,917 8,262 
2008 17,217 11,342 10,928 10,914 8,186 
2010 22,034 10,937 10,467 10,457 7,813 
2012 20,554 10,735 10,268 10,250 7,648 
2014 18,747 10,364 9,869 9,853 7,440 
2016 20,912 9,966 9,405 9,372 7,152 
Total 156,228 86,709 83,137 83,009* 13,547 
*These 83,009 observations represent data from 19,464 unique individuals across all years from 
2002 through 2016. In a single given year (i.e., in the previous rows of the table), the number of 
observations and the number of unique individuals is the same. 
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Table 2: Medicare beneficiaries 65 and older — characteristics by supplemental 








 Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
None 75.8 0.3 0.342 0.019 0.508 0.022 0.148 0.011 0.315 0.021 
Part D only 75.1 0.2 0.328 0.011 0.543 0.012 0.054 0.006 0.332 0.011 
Medicare 
Advantage 74.8 0.2 0.249 0.009 0.569 0.010 0.051 0.005 0.345 0.009 
Medigap 74.1 0.2 0.231 0.012 0.600 0.014 0.027 0.007 0.344 0.013 
Employer 
coverage 74.0 0.2 0.204 0.009 0.542 0.010 0.026 0.005 0.271 0.010 





Table 3: Medicare beneficiaries 65 and older — out-of-pocket premiums for 











spending if >0 
None $55 0.979 $2,615 
Part D only 764 0.590 1,865 
Medicare 
Advantage 810 0.419 1,396 
Medigap 2,621 0.116 2,963 
Employer coverage 2,144 0.355 3,322 
Medicaid 412 0.748 1,638 
Total 1,321 0.450 2,401 




Table 4: Medicare beneficiaries 65 and older — out-of-pocket medical care 
spending, multivariable linear models, Health and Retirement Study 2016 
 (1) (2) 
Controls included? No Yes 
   
Explanatory variables:   
None Omitted category 
   
Part D only -186 0 
 (98) (100) 
   
Medicare Advantage -350*** -133 
 (90) (91) 
   
Medigap 128 185* 
 (94) (94) 
   
Employer -203* -143 
 (85) (85) 
   
Medicaid -1,084*** -1,412*** 
 (109) (112) 
   
   
Constant 2,214*** 46 
 (76) (319) 
   
Mean of dependent 
variable $1,982 $1,982 
Unweighted sample size 80,151 80,136 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** 
p<0.001; In column 2, model includes controls for age, gender, self-
reported health and disability, labor force status, education, and year 




Table 5: Medicare beneficiaries 65 and older — is out-of-pocket spending on 
medical care/health greater than 10% of income? Multivariable linear models, 
Health and Retirement Study 2016 
 
 





Out-of-pocket health spending 
(includes premiums) 
Controls included? No Yes No Yes 
Explanatory variables: 
None Omitted category 
     
Part D only -0.043*** -0.017** 0.042*** 0.061*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
     
Medicare Advantage -0.055*** -0.023*** 0.028*** 0.054*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
     
Medigap -0.028*** -0.008 0.297*** 0.313*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
     
Employer -0.093*** -0.059*** 0.098*** 0.136*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
     
Medicaid -0.112*** -0.172*** -0.097*** -0.158*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
     
Constant 0.280*** 0.115*** 0.325*** 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.020) (0.006) (0.024) 
     
Unweighted sample 
size 80,151 80,136 80,151 80,136 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. In columns 2 and 4, 
model includes controls for age, gender, self-reported health and disability, labor force status, 
education, and year (see text for more details). 
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Figure 1: Supplemental insurance coverage of Medicare beneficiaries ages 65+ 
Health and Retirement Study, 2002 - 2016 
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Figure 2: Median out-of-pocket health care spending (1 year, respondent-level) Medicare beneficiaries ages 65+ 
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Figure 3: Percentiles of out-of-pocket health care spending Medicare beneficiaries ages 65+ by supplemental 













10th percentile 25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile 95th percentile
None Part D only Medicare Advantage
Medigap Employer coverage Medicaid
23  
Figure 4: Ratio of 90th to 50th percentile out-of-pocket health care spending (1 year, respondent-level) Medicare 
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Figure 5: Standard deviation of out-of-pocket health care spending (1 year, respondent-level) Medicare 
beneficiaries ages 65+ by supplemental insurance status, Health and Retirement Study, 2002 - 2016 
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Figure 6: Share with out-of-pocket medical care spending (not including premiums) > 10% of income Medicare 
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Figure 7: Share with out-of-pocket health spending (including premiums) > 10% of income Medicare beneficiaries 











2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
None Part D only Medicare Advantage
Medigap Employer Medicaid
Total
